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Abstract 
This paper studies the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation 
and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 
1986-2006. We estimate VARs for individual economies and panel VARs in which we 
distinguish between groups of countries on the basis of the characteristics of their 
financial systems. The results suggest that using monetary policy to offset asset price 
movements in order to guard against financial instability may have large effects on 
economic activity. Furthermore, while financial structure influences the impact of pol-
icy on asset prices, its importance appears limited. 
 
  Keywords: asset prices, monetary policy, panel VAR. 
  JEL Number: C23, E52 
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1. Introduction 
There is much agreement that asset prices, in particular residential property prices, 
provide a crucial link through which adverse macroeconomic developments can 
cause financial instability.
1 Episodes of asset price “booms” are seen as raising the 
risk of a sharp correction of prices, which could have immediate repercussions on the 
stability of financial institutions. Indeed, many observers have argued that property-
price collapses have historically played an important role in episodes of financial in-
stability at the level of individual financial institutions and the macro economy (e.g. 
Ahearne et al. 2005, Goodhart and Hofmann 2007a). 
Not surprisingly, this view has led to calls for central banks to react to movements in 
asset prices “over and beyond” what such changes imply for the path of aggregate 
demand and inflation (Borio and Lowe 2002, Cecchetti et al. 2000).  Proponents of 
this policy emphasise that episodes of financial instability could depress inflation and 
economic activity below their desired levels. Consequently, they argue, central banks 
that seek to stabilise the economy over a sufficiently long time horizon may need to 
react to current asset price movements (Bean 2004, Ahearne et al. 2005).  Impor-
tantly, they do not argue that asset prices should be targeted, only that central banks 
should be willing to tighten policy at the margin in order to slow down increases in 
asset prices that are viewed as being excessively rapid in order to reduce the likeli-
hood of a future crash that could trigger financial instability and adverse macroeco-
nomic outcomes. 
While seemingly attractive, this proposed policy has implications for central banks' 
understanding of economic developments and for the effectiveness of monetary pol-
icy (Bean 2004, Bernanke 2002, Kohn 2006). First, central banks must be able to 
identify in real time whether asset prices are moving too fast or are out of line with 
fundamentals. Second, changes in policy-controlled interest rates must have stable 
and predictable effects on asset prices. Third, the effects of monetary policy on dif-
ferent asset prices, such as residential property and equity prices, must be about as 
rapid, since stabilising one may otherwise lead to greater volatility of the other. Need-
less to say, if these criteria are not satisfied simultaneously, any attempts by central 
banks to offset asset price movements may simply raise macroeconomic volatility, 
                                            
1
   The chapters in Hunter et al. (2003) provide an excellent overview of the interlinkages between 
monetary policy, asset prices and financial stability.  2 
potentially increasing the risk of financial instability developing. Fourth, the size of 
interest rate movements required to mitigate asset price swings must not be so large 
as to cause economic activity and, in particular, inflation to deviate substantially from 
their desired levels since, if this were to be the case, the resulting macroeconomic 
cycles could lead the public to question the central bank’s commitment to price stabil-
ity. Fifth, the effects of monetary policy on asset prices must be felt sufficiently rapidly 
so that a tightening of policy impacts on asset prices before any bubble would burst 
on its own (since policy should then presumably be relaxed to offset the macro eco-
nomic effects of the collapse of the bubble).
2 
Of course, it is by no means clear that central banks are better able to judge the ap-
propriate level of asset prices and the risk of future sharp price declines than agents 
transacting in these markets. It is equally unclear whether monetary policy has pre-
dictable effects on asset prices and, if so, whether these effects occur at about the 
same time horizons for different asset prices, whether they are large relative to the 
effects of monetary policy on inflation and economic activity and whether they occur 
faster. Thus, it is not clear that any of the five criteria are satisfied. In this paper we 
attempt to shed light on these issues by exploring the responses of residential prop-
erty and equity prices, inflation and output growth to monetary policy shocks for a 
panel of 17 OECD countries using quarterly data for the period 1986-2006.  
The analysis proceeds in three steps. Following Iacoviello (2002) and Giuliodori 
(2005), we first estimate vector autoregressive models (VARs) for individual countries 
and study the impact of monetary policy on the economy.
3 Not surprisingly, the re-
sulting estimates are imprecise, leaving considerable uncertainty about the quantita-
tive effect of changes in interest rates on asset prices relative to their impact on eco-
nomic activity and inflation, as would seem to be an important precondition for mone-
tary policy to be used to mitigate asset price movements. To raise the precision of 
the estimates, we thus follow Goodhart and Hofmann (2007b) and estimate a panel 
VAR incorporating real residential property and real equity prices. Our results show 
that while monetary policy does have important effects on asset prices, those effects 
                                            
2
   Bean (2004) and Kohn (2006) discuss the implications of lags for the use of monetary policy in the 
face of asset price bubbles. 
3
   Sutton (2002) and Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) also estimate VARs incorporating residential prop-
erty prices for a range of countries. The focus of their studies, however, is on which factors explain 
movements in residential property prices and not on whether monetary policy is able to stabilize 
asset price movements. 3 
are not particularly large relative to those it has on inflation and output. This suggests 
that attempts to stabilise asset prices by using interest rate policy are likely to induce 
pronounced macroeconomic fluctuations. 
However, while the panel estimates confirm that monetary policy has predictable ef-
fects on residential property prices, by construction these estimates disregard all 
country specific information. Since a number of authors have asserted that the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy depends on the institutional characteris-
tics of the financial system, we go on to split the sample of countries into two groups 
depending on their financial structure.
4 We then estimate a panel VAR for each group 
and explore whether the impact of monetary policy on asset prices, inflation and out-
put differs between the two groups. We use several measures proposed in the litera-
ture to capture differences in financial structure, including the importance of floating 
rate lending; whether mortgage equity withdrawal is possible; the loan-to-value ratio 
for new mortgages; the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio in the economy; the method 
used to value property; whether mortgages are securitised; and the share of owner 
occupied dwellings. To preview briefly the results, we find that the financial structure 
does condition the responses of asset prices to monetary policy but also that the dif-
ferences between country groups are less important than commonly thought.
5 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section contains a discussion of the data 
and Section 3 presents the results for the VARs estimated for individual countries. In 
Section 4 we first briefly discuss panel VARs before discussing the estimates. Sec-
tion 5 focuses on the importance of financial structure and provides panel-VAR esti-
mates when the countries are divided into two groups on the basis of financial struc-
ture. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
The econometric analysis below is conducted on quarterly data on equity and resi-
dential property prices, consumer price indices (CPIs), real gross domestic product 
(GDP) and interest rates.
6 Much of the interest in the behaviour and determination of 
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   The importance of financial structure of the economy is emphasized by so many authors that it is 
impossible to provide a full overview here. See, among others, Maclennan et al. (1998), Giuliodori 
(2005), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), CGFS (2006) and Calza et al. (2007).  
5
   See Maclennan et al. (1998) for a dissenting opinion. 
6
   All results are obtained with the software RATS 7.0. 4 
asset prices stems from their role in episodes of financial instability. Since there is a 
natural tendency to focus on data from countries that have experienced pronounced 
asset-price swings, there is a risk of sample selection bias which can be mitigated by 
using data from a broad cross-section of countries. We therefore study 17 countries 
for which we could obtain both equity and residential property price data: Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.  
The sample starts in 1986 in order to avoid the more turbulent, higher inflation period 
that ended in the first half of the 1980. Moreover, and as noted by Ahearne et al. 
(2005) and Girouard and Blöndal (2001), many countries deregulated their mortgage 
markets during the early to mid-1980s, suggesting that estimates relying on older 
data are unlikely to be representative for modern economies. The data set ends in 
2006. Goodhart and Hofmann (2007b) in their panel VAR analysis also study, as a 
part of their robustness analysis, a sub-sample spanning these years and find that 
this later period indeed differs from the earlier part of their sample (although their 
data definitions are somewhat different). 
Residential property prices are from the data base of the Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS). Quarterly data over the whole sample period are available for Austra-
lia, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
UK and the US.
 7 For, Belgium we link an older series for small and medium-sized 
houses to the residential property price series for all dwellings from 1988 on. For 
Spain we link the residential property prices of existing dwellings with those of owner-
occupied homes in 2005. For Ireland and Norway we interpolate annual data with the 
Chow-Lin (1971) procedure, using a rent index and an index of residential construc-
tion cost as reference series, and link the resulting series to the BIS quarterly data 
that start in 1988 and 1991, respectively.
8 The same interpolation procedure is ap-
                                            
7
   For Australia, missing values for the first two quarters of 1986 were generated using the growth of 
residential construction cost. 
8
   Annual data for Norway are from Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004). 5 
plied to annual property price data for Germany and Italy.
9 For Japan the semi-
annual series on residential land prices is interpolated.
10   
Figure 1 shows the resulting residential property price series.
11 Interestingly, many 
economies experienced a sharp rise in residential property prices in the second half 
of the 1980s, in many cases associated with liberalisation and deregulation of the 
housing finance sector. Residential property prices were subsequently weak or fell in 
the 1990s, following the US recession in 1990-1991 and the episode of high interest 
rates in many European countries after the turmoil in the European exchange rate 
mechanism (ERM) in 1992-93 which was triggered by the adoption of tight monetary 
policy in Germany to offset the aggregate demand effects of German Reunification. 
The figure indicates that following the collapse of the “bubble economy” in Japan 
around 1990, residential property prices fell continuously until the end of the sample. 
In Germany residential property prices started falling in 1994 and declined until 2006, 
vividly indicating the depth of the “German crisis.”  
It should be emphasised from the outset that data on residential property prices are 
not necessarily comparable across countries. The main differences concern the type 
of housing that is included (single family houses, flats or all types), whether existing 
dwellings or new dwellings are considered, whether prices are per dwelling or per 
square meter, and the region (urban, non-urban or both) where the data is collected. 
While price developments vary between types of housing reflecting supply and de-
mand conditions in different market segments, the most noticeable differences arise 
with respect to the area where the data come from. Property price booms generally 
occur in metropolitan areas, and are often less pronounced if data for the whole 
country are considered. The impact of this, however, is difficult to assess since only 
few countries have series covering these different categories. As an example, Figure 
2 shows the annual increase in nominal UK residential property prices for the whole 
country and the greater London area. While the greater-London prices seem more 
volatile, both series share the same main features (their correlation is 0.82). The left 
hand panel shows the annual increase in prices for single-family houses and flats in 
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   Annual property price data for Italy are taken from Cannari et al. (2006). 
10
   In Japan, a market for old homes practically does not exist and houses are normally torn down 
after a few decades. As a consequence, land prices determine the value of housing, see the 
Economist (2008). 
11
   We note that despite the difference in data sources, the patterns are comparable to those reported 
in Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) and Ahearne et al. (2005). 6 
Switzerland. Again, the year-to-year changes differ somewhat but generally convey 
the same information (the correlation is 0.86). For our study we use whenever possi-
ble the broadest residential property price index available in order not to capture re-
gional booms. Nevertheless, great care needs to be exercised when comparing 
property-price developments across countries.  
Turning to the sources of the other data, the CPI (all items) and share price indices 
(all shares) are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI) data base. Real 
GDP data were taken from the BIS data base and supplemented with data from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) data base of the IMF.
12 For Ireland annual 
GDP data before 1997 were interpolated with the Chow-Lin (1971) procedure using 
industrial production as the reference series. We use a three-month interbank rate for 
Denmark, Switzerland, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Norway and the UK, a three-month Treasury bill rate for Belgium, Sweden and 
the US, and a three-month commercial paper rate for Australia, Canada and Japan.
13 
All interest rates are from the OECD's MEI. For Finland and Denmark missing data 
for 1986 were replaced with data from the IFS (call money rate). For the euro-area 
countries we use the three-month EURIBOR rate after 1998. Except for interest rates 
and equity prices all data are seasonally adjusted.  
 
3. VARs for individual economies 
We start by estimating VAR models for individual countries, following the approach 
taken by Giuliodori (2005), Iacoviello (2002) and Neri (2004). We include five vari-
ables: the CPI (p), real GDP (y), the three-month interest rate (i), real residential 
property prices (rhp) and real equity prices (rsp), with the real variables being ob-
tained using the CPI. Except for the interest rate, all variables are in logarithms. Be-
fore we turn to the econometric analysis it is useful to investigate the time-series 
characteristics of the data. Since we take a panel approach below, we perform panel 
unit root tests, using the test statistics suggested by Pedroni (1999).
14 The results in 
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   For the Netherlands the IFS data apparently contain an error in 1998. We therefore used real GDP 
from the MEI data base. 
13
   To eliminate a large spike during the ERM crisis we regressed the three-month interest rate for 
Ireland on a dummy, which is unity in 1992Q4 and zero elsewhere, before conducting the analysis.  
14
   We also studied the time series properties of the data for individual countries, which were general-
ly compatible with the panel results discussed in the main text. However, given the sheer amount 
of test results, we refrain from commenting on them.  7 
Table 1 indicate that all variables are nonstationary in levels, but stationary in first 
differences.  
Next we test for cointegration between the variables.
15 When using a common lag 
length of four for all countries, the existence of at least one cointegrating vector could 
not be rejected except in Japan, Sweden and the US. When using fewer lags, how-
ever, also for these countries the existence of cointegration could not be rejected. We 
therefore specify the VAR models in the level of the variables. Nevertheless, we nei-
ther impose the number of cointegrating relations on the systems nor do we attempt 
to impose overidentifying restrictions on the cointegrating vector.  
For an individual country n, n = 1, … , N, the reduced form of the VAR thus can be 
written as  t n t n n n t n Y L A Y , , , ) ( ε μ + + = , where  ) , , , , ( , , , , , , t n t n t n t n t n t n rsp rhp i y p Y = , μn is a con-
stant, An(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator and  t n, ε  is a vector of normally, 
identically distributed disturbances. For each country the number of lags included in 
the VAR is chosen by the Akaike information criterion, considering a maximum lag 
length of four. 
To identify the shocks, we use a Choleski decomposition, with the variables ordered 
as above, which is standard in the monetary transmission literature (see Christiano et 
al. 1999). This triangular identification structure allows output and the price level to 
react only with a lag to monetary policy shocks, whereas property and equity prices 
may respond immediately. We thus assume that central banks react to current output 
growth and inflation when setting interest rates, but not to current property and equity 
prices.
16  
While this last assumption may seem controversial in that few observers would doubt 
that central banks react to changes in asset prices since these influence aggregate 
demand and inflation pressures, barring exceptional circumstances one would not 
expect any reactions to be instantaneous but rather to occur if asset prices rise or fall 
for some time. By contrast, asset prices react immediately to changes in monetary 
policy. Thus, it seems sensible to attribute the contemporaneous correlation between 
interest rates and asset prices to reactions by the latter to the former rather than con-
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   Iacoviello (2002) argues that a long-run relation between GDP and real residential property prices 
should exist. 
16
   To identify the monetary policy shock it is sufficient to determine the position of the monetary poli-
cy instrument; the ordering of the variables in the groups before and after the interest rate does not 
matter. 8 
versely. We have explored whether the results are sensitive to this assumption. Not 
surprisingly, for equity prices the ordering does matter but for residential property 
prices it does not. However, the alternative assumption that the contemporaneous 
correlation between innovations in interest rates and equity prices is due solely to 
reactions by monetary policy is not only implausible for the reasons mentioned, but 
also leads to counterintuitive results. For instance, equity prices start to increase after 
a contractionary monetary policy shock.
17 It therefore seems appropriate to order the 
interest rate before the asset prices in the system.  
Figure 3 shows the bootstrapped impulse responses to a monetary policy shock of 
25 basis points in the single-country VARs.
18 Since these models involve the estima-
tion of a large number of parameters, impulse responses are imprecisely estimated. 
Many analysts therefore use plus/minus one standard-error (i.e., 68%) confidence 
bands. We therefore do so too. However, the impulse responses arising from the 
panel VARs are more precisely estimated since the data are pooled. To take that into 
account when conducting inference, we use plus/minus two standard-error (i.e., 95%) 
confidence bands in this case. In order to permit comparison with the single country 
VARs, we show plus/minus one and plus/minus two standard-error wide boot-
strapped confidence bands in all graphs. Given the large number of impulse re-
sponses generated by the estimation process, we focus on the general features of 
the results.  
As a preliminary, note that the impulse responses are frequently statistically insignifi-
cant even when the 68% confidence bands are used. After a monetary policy shock 
the CPI falls, though in most countries it takes about 15 to 20 quarters before the 
maximum effect is felt. Nevertheless, in some countries the CPI rises in the short run, 
indicating the presence of a “price puzzle.”
19 Because of the wide confidence bands, 
however, this effect is significant only in Australia, Switzerland and the UK. Real GDP 
declines after a monetary policy shock in all countries, and significantly so in about 
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   This is also inconsistent with results obtained with structural identification assumptions relying on 
the long-run effects of monetary policy, see Lastrapes (1998). 
18
   The bootstrapped confidence bounds are obtained using the methodology proposed by Sims and 
Zha (1999) and are based on 1000 replications. 
19  
The price puzzle arises because central banks change interest rates in response to predicted fu-
ture changes in inflation, that is, information that the econometrician does not incorporate in the 
analysis. See Walsh (Chapter 1, 2003) for a discussion.
 9 
half of them. It is notable that GDP reacts much faster than the CPI to a monetary 
policy shock.  
Of particular interest is the reaction of asset prices. Except for Germany and Spain, 
residential property prices fall in reaction to monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, 
there appear to be interesting differences across countries: the fall of residential 
property prices is significantly different from zero even at the 95% level in Canada, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. More-
over, while in some countries, (including Finland, the UK and the US) residential 
property prices respond immediately to a monetary policy shock, in others, (e.g., Bel-
gium or Spain), the responses are much slower and more persistent. However, the 
confidence bands are wide and it is hard to tell whether the responses differ system-
atically across countries. For equity prices the reaction to monetary policy shocks is 
generally negative and significant on impact but typically becomes insignificant after 
two quarters. 
Since the results for the single-country VARs are inconclusive and frequently insig-
nificant, we go on to estimate a panel VAR (PVAR) under the assumption that pool-
ing the data is likely to sharpen the estimates.  
 
4. Panel VARs 
There is a large literature on the estimation of panel regressions and the inconsis-
tency that can arise in that context. Much of that literature deals with the bias of the 
fixed effects estimator in dynamic homogeneous panels that results from the inclu-
sion of lagged endogenous variables (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988). This bias is particu-
larly severe if the time dimension is small but can be overcome by using GMM or in-
strumental variables estimators. Since we are in the fortunate position of having a 
rather long sample period, we need not be overly concerned about this source of 
bias. 
However, our main interest in this paper concerns the dynamic effect of monetary 
policy in a group of countries that have widely different financial structures. Unfortu-
nately, it is well known that the standard fixed effects estimator is inconsistent in dy-
namic panels even if the time dimension is large if the coefficients on the lagged en-
dogenous variables differ across groups, which is likely in our case. The reason is 
that restricting the slope coefficients to be the same across groups induces serial cor-
relation in the residuals when the regressors are autocorrelated. This serial correla-10 
tion does not vanish when instrumental variable estimation is applied (see Pesaran 
and Smith 1995). We therefore follow Pesaran and Smith's recommendation and es-
timate the PVAR by the mean group estimator.
20 This estimator averages the coeffi-
cients across groups and provides a consistent estimate of the average effects. As 
we found evidence of fixed effects in the GDP and equity-price equations, we esti-
mate the VAR with country-specific intercepts.  
The panel VAR thus can be written as  t n t n n n t n Y L A Y , 1 , , ) ( ε μ + + = − , where  t n Y ,  is a 
1 × N  vector containing the observations for the N countries, n = 1, …  N; μn is a 
country-specific intercept and An(L) is a lag polynomial with the VAR coefficients. The 
disturbances,  t n, ε , have zero means and a country-specific variance, 
2
n σ . We as-
sume that the coefficients in An(L) vary randomly across countries, i.e., that the typi-
cal element 
p
j , i , n a  in An(L) can be written as 
p
j , i , n
p
j , i
p
j , i , n a a η + = , where n is the country 
index, p = 1, …, P, the lag order of the VAR and i, j = 1,  … K the number of variables 
in the VAR.  
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks as implied by the 
panel regression. Not surprisingly, the large increase in information that comes from 
using the panel approach generates impulse responses that typically are significantly 
different from zero at the 95% level. 
Again, we consider the responses to a 25 basis point increase in the interest rate. 
After a monetary policy shock the price level takes six quarters before it starts to fall, 
with the effect becoming significant only after about two years. This slow response 
may be a consequence of some countries showing a “price puzzle” in their reaction 
to a monetary policy shock.
21 Furthermore, the results indicate that output falls for 
about six quarters in response to the monetary policy shock before recovering slowly. 
Residential property prices reach their trough somewhat earlier after three quarters 
but take even longer to recover. By contrast, equity prices, which are eminently for-
ward-looking variables, fall immediately following the increase in interest rates and 
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   The persistence is indeed larger if the PVAR is estimated by conventional fixed effects. Assen-
macher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008b) provide a discussion of this issue. 
21
   While our results do not indicate the presence of a price puzzle, we nevertheless believe that the 
estimates underpredict the impact of monetary policy on the level of prices since we do not include 
indicators of future inflation in our VAR system. 11 
have returned to the original level by the time output and property prices have re-
turned about half way to their initial levels. 
These findings warrant several comments. First, the reactions of prices and output to 
the shocks are similar to those found in the literature based on single-country studies 
(see, e.g. Christiano et al. (1999) for the US and the VAR studies in Angeloni et al. 
(2003) for the euro area). Second, the responses of residential property prices lead 
those of real GDP by about three quarters. This suggests that changes in property 
prices influence GDP via their effects on wealth and consumption demand. Third, the 
width of the confidence bands indicates that the responses of residential property 
prices are, statistically, about as well defined as the impact on real economic activity. 
Fourth and most importantly, the point estimate shows that after about one year resi-
dential property prices have fallen about three times as much as the level of real 
GDP, that is, by 0.375% rather than by 0.125%. Taken at face value, this three-to-
one estimate suggests that while monetary policy could in principle be used to offset 
swings in residential property prices that are seen as causing a threat to financial 
stability, it would induce potentially large swings in real economic activity: To offset a 
15% rise in residential property prices, which is not an unusually large increase by 
the standards of many recent property price booms, the central bank must be willing 
to depress real GDP by 5%, a substantial amount.
22 Moreover, while the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on equity prices is about as large as the peak effect on resi-
dential property prices, the marked difference in timing implies that monetary policy 
cannot be used to target or influence both. 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that gearing monetary policy to asset 
prices is likely to generate pronounced swings in economic activity and to stabilise 
some asset prices at the costs of inducing more instability in others. 
 
5. How important is financial structure? 
One problem with the panel VAR estimates is that they mask any potential heteroge-
neity across the 17 countries in our sample. This is unfortunate since many authors 
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   See also Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008a). Proponents of using monetary policy to 
mitigate swings in asset prices, such as Borio and Lowe (2002), do not seem concerned by the 
impact of such a policy on economic activity. By contrast, opponents, such as Kohn (2006), do 
worry about the effects on output and inflation. Interestingly, experimental evidence also shows 
that interest rate policy is not effective in dealing with asset price bubbles, see Becker et al. 
(2007). 12 
have argued that the impact of monetary policy on the economy varies across coun-
tries depending on the financial structure of the economy (Cecchetti 1999, Ehrmann 
et al. 2003, Giuliodori 2005). Moreover, it is well documented that the financial struc-
ture differs significantly between the countries we consider (Maclennan et al. 1998; 
Calza et al. 2007). However, little quantitative evidence on the importance of these 
characteristics has been presented in the literature.
23 One problem with doing so is 
the nature of the available data. Institutional characteristics change little over time, so 
that time series analysis with such data is precluded. Moreover, while there are sev-
eral characteristics that might influence the effects of monetary policy on financial 
stability, there is no agreement on which characteristics are most important and how 
best to measure these.  
With these caveats in mind, we selected a number of potentially relevant criteria from 
the literature, divided the countries in two groups on the basis of these criteria and 
estimated a panel VAR for each group in order to assess the importance of financial 
structure.
24 We emphasise that in compiling information on financial structure from 
different sources comparability is a readily apparent issue. One example is the loan-
to-valuation (LTV) ratio, where some studies quote the maximum, while others refer 
to the average, LTV ratio. In addition, a considerable judgement is required when 
grouping countries according to these criteria. Consider, for instance, the classifica-
tion of countries as having fixed or flexible mortgage interest rates. While a majority 
of mortgages with an interest-rate adjustment at three months' notice certainly classi-
fies as flexible, it is much more difficult to decide whether interest rates that are fixed 
between one and five years (e.g., Italy; see Calza et al. 2007) should be regarded as 
fixed or flexible. Any grouping of countries is therefore subjective and disputable. 
We deal with this problem in two ways. First, we analyse a broad range of indicators 
to ensure that we capture as many as possible aspects of the structure of mortgage 
financing. Second, for the quantitative characteristics, such as the LTV ratio, mort-
gage-debt-to-GDP ratio and owner-occupation rate, we group the countries accord-
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   An exception is Calza et al. (2007) who compute correlations between the peak effect of a mone-
tary policy shock and mortgage market indicators. Of course, there is no lack of cross-country stu-
dies that find differences in monetary transmission and attribute these to differences in financial 
structure. However, the estimated impulse responses may differ for many other reasons, including 
the conduct of monetary policy and other differences in economic structure that are not taken into 
account. Here we investigate the effect of financial structure more directly.  
24
   We let the lag length in the VARs be determined by the AIC. 13 
ing to whether they are above or below the median value of the respective criterion. 
Since the data quoted in the literature differ with respect to the methodology used 
and change over time, we emphasise that our method is robust if the ranking of the 
countries is stable. 
When interpreting the results, it is important to verify that the criteria are not leading 
to the same allocation of countries to the two groups. We therefore computed the 
correlations between the different criteria and found that they are close to zero.
25 
With this as a preliminary, we turn to a discussion of the seven characteristics in Ta-
ble 2, their presumed influence on the effects of monetary policy shocks and the re-
sults in Figure 5 to 12. 
The first is the importance of floating rate financing. It is commonly believed that in 
economies in which mortgage rates are tied to short-term interest rates, changes in 
monetary policy has relatively large effects on residential property prices, and there-
fore on the economy, since the interest rates on all loans are reset at the same time. 
In contrast, in the case of fixed rate lending, only new borrowers are affected by 
changes in interest rates.
26 It is therefore sometimes argued that fixed-rate mort-
gages are less risky than floating-rate mortgages. However, an unexpected fall in the 
steady-state inflation rate exposes fixed-rate borrowers to an increase in the real in-
terest rate. This effect may have been a factor contributing to the fall in residential 
property prices and the generally weak economic performance in the 1990s in Ger-
many and Japan, both of which rely predominantly on fixed-rate financing. 
In Figure 5 we present the results obtained when we distinguish between countries 
depending on the prevalence of fixed- versus variable-rate mortgages. As one would 
expect, the effects of monetary policy on GDP and residential property prices are 
large when variable-rate mortgages are prevalent. Surprisingly, the reaction of equity 
prices to monetary policy is almost twice as large. In addition the reaction in the 
fixed-rate group seems to be more persistent, which is compatible with the idea that 
in economies in which fixed-rate financing is important, higher short-term interest 
                                            
25
   The only significant correlation, 0.65, is that between mortgage equity withdrawal and the mort-
gage-debt-to-GDP ratio. The other correlation coefficients lie between -0.03 and 0.44. Interesting-
ly, a low share of owner-occupied homes is correlated with a correlation coefficient of about 0.4 
with a low LTV ratio, no securitisation and the use of historical mortgage valuation practices. 
26
   See Maclennan et al. (1998). Calza et al. (2007) present a model which implies that the sensitivity 
of consumption to monetary policy shocks is higher with variable-rate mortgages. 14 
rates will only over time become embedded in mortgage interest rates and therefore 
impact on GDP and property prices with a delay.   
The second feature we consider is the importance of housing equity withdrawal. If 
households are able to withdraw equity, one would expect them to do so in response 
to rising residential property prices. This would boost consumption spending and ag-
gregate demand, and might further increase residential property prices. The process 
will also work in reverse: a tightening of monetary policy that triggers declines in resi-
dential property prices is likely to have a greater impact on residential property prices 
and GDP than if mortgage equity extraction is not possible.  
Figure 6 shows that the ability to withdraw mortgage equity influences the timing, but 
less so the size, of the reactions of GDP to monetary policy shocks. In economies 
where equity withdrawal is possible, GDP shows an immediate decline after a mone-
tary policy shock, which is less significant and shorter-lived than the GDP decline in 
the other group. The reactions of the other variables to a monetary policy shock are 
essentially the same.  
A third important characteristic of the financial system is the LTV ratio. A high LTV 
ratio means that households can relatively easily obtain financing to purchase prop-
erty, suggesting that the effects of changes in interest rates are likely to be marked. 
Furthermore, interest rate increases may be more contractionary since households 
have less equity and thus may be more prone to default in conditions of economic 
hardship. Figure 7 shows that the reaction of property prices in the high-LTV group is 
slightly larger but that the differences between both groups are negligible.  
The fourth characteristic is the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio. Since data on the aver-
age LTV ratio are difficult to obtain and banks presumably apply different criteria to 
different borrowers, the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP provides an alternative meas-
ure for the responsiveness of the housing market to interest rate changes. Figure 8 
shows that real GDP falls more quickly and for a longer period in reaction to mone-
tary policy shocks in countries with high mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio. Contrary to our 
expectation, however, the response of residential property prices is larger in the 
group with the lower mortgage-debt-to GDP ratio.  
The fifth characteristic is the valuation method that is used in different countries. If 
banks base lending decisions on the current, as opposed to the historical, valuation 
level, households’ ability to borrow will be more sensitive to current economic condi-
tions and monetary policy. Thus, Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) hypothesise that resi-15 
dential property prices fall faster and by more in economies in which properties are 
valued using their current market prices. According to Figure 9, however, there are 
no differences in the mean responses of residential property prices and GDP but the 
responses are more precisely estimated in economies in which properties are valued 
using their current market prices.  
The sixth characteristic we assess is whether it matters if mortgage loans are secu-
ritised. It has been argued that the increased reliance on capital markets for mort-
gage funding associated with securitisation implies stronger effects of monetary pol-
icy on the economy and on residential property prices (CGFS 2006). On the other 
hand, Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) conjecture that the prevalence of securitisation 
should reduce the sensitivity of residential property prices to monetary policy shocks 
since it allows banks to transfer the credit risk associated with mortgages to the capi-
tal market. Without securitisation the risk of credit crunches would therefore be com-
mensurately larger, implying that the effects of monetary policy may be more pro-
nounced in economies in which mortgage loans are not securitised.   
Figure 10 suggests that residential property prices in countries  in which securitisa-
tion is not common fall by more in response to monetary policy shocks than in coun-
tries in which securitisation plays an important role. This may be because if banks 
hold mortgages on their balance sheets, weak residential property prices impact on 
their willingness to lend. By contrast, GDP falls by more in economies where securiti-
sation is frequent; indicating that the fall in residential property prices impacts more 
on the overall economy in these countries.   
Finally, we consider whether the share of owner-occupied housing matters. With high 
owner-occupancy rates, the wealth effect of monetary policy should be important and 
one would expect a larger impact of monetary policy shocks on GDP (see Maclennan 
et al. 1998). On the other hand, landlords or institutional investors owning rental 
housing also will experience a wealth effect and the argument rests on their wealth 
effect being smaller than that for the owner occupiers. Figure 11 shows that, contrary 
to our hypothesis, the effect on real property prices is smaller if the share of owner-
occupied housing is large. This can be the case when house owners do not regard 
their house as a liquid asset, or when the possibility of equity withdrawal does not 
exist. 
In sum, we find that differences in financial structure do not seem to matter much for 
the impact of monetary policy on residential property prices and the economy more 16 
broadly. This may be either because we miss important characteristics that influence 
the responses to monetary policy shocks, such as the structure of the pension and 
the tax systems, or because the indicators used to group countries are poor.
27 It may 
also be that the characteristics of the mortgage finance system interact with each 
other, and that their effect can only be detected when they are considered jointly. For 
that reason we explore whether the countries where the criteria generally suggest a 
large impact of monetary policy on residential property prices and economic activity 
indeed show a larger reaction to monetary policy shocks.
28 However, Figure 12 
shows that the responses of residential property prices to monetary policy shocks do 
not seem to depend significantly on the criteria we investigated. A possible explana-
tion is that some characteristics that make residential property prices more sensitive 
to monetary policy typically come together with other characteristics that have a par-
tially offsetting effect. For instance, it may be that the ability to take a second mort-
gage dampens the responses of households in economies in which floating rate lend-
ing is prevalent. While the reaction of residential property prices seems not to depend 
strongly on the characteristics we investigated above, the reaction of equity prices 
and GDP are indeed larger and more persistent in countries in which we expect the 
monetary transmission mechanism to be stronger.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the impact of monetary policy stocks on inflation, out-
put and asset prices, using VARs and panel VARs estimated on quarterly data span-
ning 1986 to 2006. The analysis suggests several tentative conclusions regarding the 
ability of using monetary policy to “lean against” residential property price and stock 
price booms.  
First, the panel VAR results indicate that monetary policy has large and predictable 
effects on residential property prices, and that these effects are roughly coincident 
with its effect on real economic activity. More precisely, 25 basis points increase in 
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   This is suggested by the fact that they vary considerably between studies. 
28
   For each of the seven criteria listed in Table 2, we assigned a value of unity to those countries 
where we expected a large reaction to monetary policy shocks on the basis of this criterion. We 
then constructed an index of the expected effects of monetary policy by summing the entries for 
each country. We expect large effects of monetary policy when a country exceeds the median val-
ue of the index.  17 
short-term interest rates depresses real GDP by about 0.125%, and real residential 
property prices by about three times as much, or 0.375%, after one or two years.  
While these results suggest that monetary policy could potentially be used to slow 
down property price booms, the estimates imply that substantial interest rate in-
creases would be necessary to do so and that these increases would depress real 
GDP considerably. For instance, a 250 basis point increase in interest rates would 
depress residential property prices by about 3.75% and real GDP by about 1.25%. 
Given that episodes of property price upswings have generally been associated with 
movements in prices of 15-20%, one is led to conclude that the cost of using mone-
tary policy to slow down asset-price movements in order to reduce threats to financial 
stability might be large in terms of real output. 
Of course, these estimates may well be wrong and it is possible that the impact on 
real property prices might be larger relative to real GDP than the three-to-one ratio 
we estimate here. But even if they are much larger, say five-to-one, the impact on 
real economic activity of an attempt to depress residential property prices are never-
theless likely to be pronounced.  
Second, the estimates also indicate that monetary policy shocks depress equity 
prices by about as much as they depress residential property prices. However, equity 
prices decline immediately in this case and are back to the initial level by the time 
residential property prices reach their through. As a consequence of this difference in 
timing, it is not possible to use monetary to stabilise both residential property and eq-
uity prices.   
Third, the individual-country VAR estimates are highly imprecise. This may reflect an 
inherent shortcoming of VAR analysis: with a large number of parameters the esti-
mates are necessarily subject to considerable uncertainty. If so, a central bank that is 
persuaded that policy can and should be used to influence asset prices could pro-
ceed despite the evidence to the contrary. Another interpretation, more plausible to 
us and compatible with the arguments of Kohn (2006), is that the impact of monetary 
policy on asset prices is in fact highly uncertain, suggesting that central banks might 
wish to refrain from attempting to steer asset prices. 
Fourth, our panel VAR analysis of the different subgroups of countries indicate that 
while the effects of monetary policy on residential property prices do appear influ-
enced by an economy’s financial structure, the differences are not large. It is possible 
that better data on financial structure may lead us to have to revise this conclusion. 18 
But it is also possible that such data will lead us to conclude that that one aspect of 
financial structure that seems to increase the economy’s sensitivity to monetary pol-
icy may be partially offset by another, reducing the overall differences between 
economies.  
Overall, we therefore interpret our results as suggesting that the proponents of using 
monetary policy to lean against asset-price fluctuations in order to ensure financial 
stability may have been too hasty to conclude that this is a sensible strategy.  19 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Panel unit root tests 
 Level  Difference 
 LLC  IPS  LLC  IPS 
CPI 0.20  0.30  -3.82*  -6.48* 
Real GDP  -0.93  -1.46  -16.25*  -15.55* 
Interest rate  0.36  -0.17  -11.77*  -14.29* 
Real property prices  0.80 1.31 -5.41*  -7.80* 
Real equity prices  -1.24  -1.56  -18.45*  -22.73
* 
Note: LLC is the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test, IPS the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) 
test. Except for the interest rate, where we include a constant only, the tests for the 
levels include a constant and a trend and five lags, whereas the test for the differ-
ences include a constant and four lags. The test statistics are distributed as N(0,1). * 
denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of mortgage markets 
 Interest  rate 
adjustment 
(1) 
Mortgage equity 
withdrawal 
(2) 
Average loan-to-
value ratio (%)
(3) 
Mortgage–debt-to-
GDP ratio (%)
(4) 
Valuation method
(5) 
Securiti-
sation 
(6) 
Share of owner-
occupied homes (%) 
(7) 
Australia Variable  Yes  90-100  74  Market  value Yes  70 
Belgium Fixed  No  80-85  31  Market  value No  72 
Canada Fixed  Unused  70-80  43  Lending  value  Yes  66 
Denmark Fixed  Yes  80  67  Market  value  No  59 
Finland Variable  Yes  75-80  40  Market  value  No  64 
France Fixed No  80  26  Market  value  No  56 
Germany Fixed  No  70  52  Lending  value No  42 
Ireland Variable  Yes  60-70  53  Market  value  Yes 78 
Italy Fixed  No  50  15  Market  value  No  80 
Japan Fixed  Yes  80  36  Market  value  No 61 
Netherlands Fixed  Yes  112  111  Market  value  Yes  53 
Norway Variable  Yes  70  63  Market  value  No  77 
Spain Variable  Unused  80  46  Market  value  Yes  85 
Sweden Variable  Yes  80-90  54  Market  value No  61 
Switzerland Variable  No  66  128  Lending  value  No  36 
UK Variable  Yes  70  73  Market  value  Yes  70 
US Fixed  Yes  80  69  Market  value  Yes  69 
Note: Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) are from Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), columns (3), (4) and (7) are from Calza et al. (2007), with information 
for Norway and Sweden taken from Ahearne et al. (2005) and for Switzerland from CGFS (2006).  24 
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Figure 2. Annual property-price growth rates for subcategories 
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Figure 3. Impulse responses to a 25 basis points interest rate shock 
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Figure 3 (cont.): Impulse responses to a 25 basis points interest rate shock 
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Figure 3 (cont.): Impulse responses to a 25 basis points interest rate shock 
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Note: Impulse responses are the bootstrapped mean response, using the approach recommended by Sims and Zha (1999). Long 
dashes indicate two-standard-error, short dashes one-standard error confidence bands. Results are based on 1000 bootstrap repli-
cations. 29 
 
Figure 4. Panel VAR 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. 
 
Figure 5. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage rate 
Variable mortgage rate Fixed mortgage rate
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 6. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage equity withdrawal 
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With mortgage equity withdrawal Without mortgage equity withdrawal
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 7. Panel VAR split with respect to loan-to-value ratio 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 8. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio 31 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 9. Panel VAR split with respect to valuation method 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 10. Panel VAR split with respect to securitisation. 32 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 11. Panel VAR split with respect to owner occupancy 
High owner occupancy Low owner occupancy
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
 
Figure 12. Panel VAR split according to the sum of financial structure in-
dicators 33 
 
Large effects of monetary policy expected Small effects of monetary policy expected
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Note: See note to Figure 3. Countries in the first group include Australia, 
Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US; 
countries in the second group are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan and Switzerland. 
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